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Abstract 
Private governance is currently being evoked as a viable solution to many public policy 
goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and 
even disastrous consequences as in the case of the financial crisis that is raging in most 
advanced economies. Although the current track record of private regulatory schemes is 
mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policy-makers give 
priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policy-
makers to devise when, and under what circumstances, these solutions can prove viable 
from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this 
paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify 
possible policy tools to be applied by public policy-makers to efficiently and effectively 
approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step 
theoretical framework and argue that IA techniques should: i) define an integrated 
framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used as an 
alternative or as a complement to public legislation; ii) involve private parties in public IAs 
in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the 
regulatory objectives; and iii) contemplate the deployment of indicators related to 
governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes 
with other regulators.  
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Fabrizio Cafaggi and Andrea Renda 
ver the past three decades, a growing number of national governments and 
international organizations have taken action to promote greater awareness in 
governments’ approach to the formulation, implementation and revision of legal 
rules. Smart regulation tools such as ex ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA) are being 
heavily sponsored internationally, and coupled with the promotion of stakeholder 
consultation and participatory decision-making, monitoring of the implementation of 
legislation, and ex post evaluation.1 Guidance documents and overarching principles on ‘how 
to regulate’ have proliferated thanks to the work of OECD, the World Bank and other 
international organizations, including the United States Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs and the European Commission, whose Impact Assessment Guidelines are 
being adopted as reference by many EU and non-EU countries.2 Moreover, the need for a 
risk-based approach to regulation and inspections, as well as enhanced attention for ‘cutting 
red tape’ – i.e. reducing administrative burdens generated by public legislation – are 
becoming firmly embedded patterns in many countries’ smart regulation agenda.3  
At the same time, in particular with the financial and economic crisis that disrupted the 
global economy since 2007, the idea of ‘how to regulate’ is undergoing thorough revisiting. 
Undoubtedly, besides an array of disastrous consequences, the crisis has also created 
opportunities for a better understanding of how markets (do not) work, and how 
governments can interact with private players to achieve public policy goals more 
effectively. One of the consequences of this trend is that the ‘less is more’ philosophy that 
dominated the 1980s and 1990s, mostly aimed at minimizing public interference with market 
forces, is no longer a dominant paradigm.4 The need to ensure at least regular monitoring of 
market outcomes by public policymakers is considered as a basic safeguard of social welfare: 
at the same time, even the basic paradigms of competition-oriented legislation, such as the 
liberalization of network industries, are being challenged as potentially sub-optimal, leaving 
room for intermediate solutions between the laissez faire and ‘command and control’ 
legislation.  
Meanwhile, confidence in the virtues of market-generated outcomes, as well as distrust for 
government’s ability to regulate, has led to widespread advocacy for forms of private 
regulation in lieu of public regulation. As a legacy of this belief, most guidance documents on 
ex ante policy appraisal specify that governments should award priority to self- and co-
                                                   
1 See Renda (2011) for an overview.  
2 See European Commission (2010); and OECD (2009). 
3 See OECD (2010). 
4 We refer to the idea that dominated economic theory and international regulatory reform in the 
1980s and 1990s, namely the belief that reducing the amount of regulation would trigger increases in 
competitiveness. A good example is the publication by the UK Better Regulation Task Force, entitled 
“Regulation - Less is more. Reducing burdens, improving outcomes”, dated March 2005.  
O 
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regulatory solutions before starting to consider more intrusive policy approaches.5  As a 
result, key policy domains have increasingly been left in the remit of private players, with 
limited or no interference by public policymakers. The trend towards increasing reliance on 
private governance and regulation by public policymakers is visible also in the field that 
generated the current crisis, i.e. financial markets. Consider the unfortunate decision, in the 
United States, to delegate to private regulation a key area for public policy such as the 
supervision of banks’ risk exposure:6 the disastrous consequences of the decision to delegate 
risk monitoring to the private-led Consolidated Supervised Entities program in the US 
ultimately led Nobel Prize Joseph Stiglitz to argue that “self-regulation is preposterous”. 
And even Nicolas Sarkozy commented that self-regulation was finished, and that principles-
based regulation lost all its credibility in the financial services sector.  
The problem of risk supervision in financial markets is perhaps the single most astounding 
black hole of public policy in the past century.7 But how could such a huge regulatory gap 
emerge? Some commentators have pointed the finger at the lack of real policy appraisal in 
the US financial regulation: as a matter of fact, tools such as RIA are not compulsory in the 
United States beyond secondary legislation passed by government agencies (Renda, 2006); 
since the SEC is an independent agency, its decisions were not subject to a publicly available, 
motivated economic analysis, which would have included risk assessment. However, this 
amounts only to a fairly incomplete explanation: suffice it to recall that in the EU, a long, 
detailed and costly Impact Assessment produced in 2004 by the European Commission on 
the capital adequacy directive that would form integral part of the Basel II package, after 
considering the results of four external studies, reported that “even if no regulatory regime is 
able to completely eliminate the possibility for banking crisis, the new framework should 
nevertheless help reduce the frequency of such incidents”.8 As one of us reported in a recent 
book, the fact that the subprime mortgage crisis led also to a credit crunch and an economic 
crisis in the EU also depends on the very bad functioning of the large exposure reporting 
system foreseen by the Basel II package: in a nutshell, banks that had limited information 
about their risk exposure enjoyed relative discretion in selecting information to be sent to 
supervisory authorities: this ultimately led the system to walk on thin ice, until the system 
broke down (Renda, 2011; FSB, de la Larosière report, Turner report). 
                                                   
5 See inter alia Senden (2005) and Saurwein (2011). Co-regulation was described by van Schooten & 
Verschuuren (2008) as an element of “non-state law” backed by “some government involvement”. 
6  In 2004, after the highly contested 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act passed by the Clinton 
Administration – and also due to the lack of explicit statutory authority to require investment bank 
holding companies to report their capital, maintain liquidity, or submit to leverage requirements – the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created the Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) 
Program as a way for global investment bank conglomerates that lacked a supervisor under law to 
voluntarily submit to regulation. This gradually led to delegating to private banks the supervision of 
risk and the preservation of sustainable banks’ debt-equity ratios, beyond the reach of public 
policymakers. In 2008, the Chairman of the SEC Christopher Cox declared that “when Congress 
passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it created a significant regulatory gap by failing to give to the 
SEC or any agency the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies, like Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns”. He added very simply 
that “the last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work”, and 
put the CSE Program to an end.  
7 SEC Chairman Cox reflected on the fact that today “a massive hole remains: the approximately $60 
trillion credit default swap (CDS) market, which is regulated by no agency of government. Neither the 
SEC nor any regulator has authority even to require minimum disclosure.” 
8 SEC (2004)921, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), 14 July 2007 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2004/sec_2004_0921_en.pdf). 
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Against this background, the financial crisis can teach us two separate lessons from the two 
sides of the Atlantic. In the US, reliance on the private sector was simply ill-conceived, 
especially since private players have been invited to coordinate to solve a market failure, 
with no control whatsoever on the side of government. To the contrary, in the EU the 
supervision of risk exposure was not fully delegated to the banking sector: however, public 
policy was based on a badly designed reporting system, which – although compulsory – led 
to an exacerbation of information distortion in the system. With a degree of over-
simplification, one could say there was a failure of private regulation in the US, and a failure 
of public regulation and oversight in the EU.  
The recent history of financial markets, although certainly being the ‘poster child’ of this 
uncertain generation of public policy, is however only the tip of a much larger iceberg. 
Although private governance is often aimed at ensuring the (private) production of public 
goods, commentators have started to spot cases in which reliance on private regulation is 
either excessive or misplaced. Examples are numerous, and relate to a wide spectrum of 
policy domains: from the ‘Action Plan’ implemented in the US by the Utilities Solid Wastes 
Activity Group (USWAG) to foster the adoption of strict standards for groundwater safety9; 
to the obscure effects of widespread public-private interaction in crucial initiatives such as 
the Africa Stockpiles Programme (Falkner, 2003); to the failure of private regulation to keep 
down international roaming tariffs in the EU (which led to action being taken by the 
Commission in 2007); and to many examples of self-regulation, e.g. in legal professions and 
pension schemes.  
So, should we just get rid of the idea that private players can be good regulators? The 
answer, of course, is no. As a matter of fact, there is widespread agreement on the fact that 
many forms of private governance pursue highly desirable goals from a societal 
perspective.10 For example, voluntary certification and standardization bodies often aim at 
re-allocating entitlements, solving collective action problems and raising the awareness of 
end consumers on the respect of minimum health- or environment- related standards. In 
some cases, private players decide to coordinate in order to solve market failures that 
governments are unable to tackle; in other cases, private regulation aims at fixing 
government failures, especially when international supply chains penetrate territories with 
very weak rule of law enforcements; in other cases, private players organize to avoid that 
public regulators step into a specific policy area to regulate directly; and in yet another range 
of cases, private players coordinate to achieve socially undesirable goals, such as collective 
boycotts, cartels, exchange of information among competitors and other anticompetitive 
behaviour (Cafaggi, 2010).  
Against this background, what creates concern is that public bodies seem to have developed 
no means to design collaborative forms of control the evolution of public/private 
governance. This paper thus seeks to lay the foundations for a better understanding of 
private governance for public policy purposes. Section 1 below briefly summarizes the main 
reasons for the emergence of private governance and its justification from a theoretical 
perspective. Section 2 provides a taxonomy of existing forms of private governance. Section 3 
describes current trends, including the emergence of meta-private regulators that aim at 
bridging the gap between public policy and private governance. Section 4 concludes by 
                                                   
9 In 2008, a chain of events led to the collapse of an earthen dam in Tennessee, and a toxic stew 
containing 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash inundated a portion of Roane County and contaminated 
a river coursing through a far larger region of Appalachia (quote). 
10 More generally, an important difference can be established between industry-led and NGO-led 
private regulatory schemes. 
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proposing a theoretical framework for the assessment of private governance by public 
policymakers.  
1. Private governance: a theoretical framework 
The variety of private regulatory schemes in place is remarkable, encompassing inter alia 
common rules, memoranda of understanding, regulatory contracts, codes of conduct and 
voluntary agreements by which economic actors, social players, NGOs and organized 
groups establish themselves voluntarily to regulate and organize their activities.11 In some 
cases, private regulation emerges spontaneously, independently of any legislative or policy 
initiative (e.g. in the case of forestry where was the failure of reaching consensus at the Rio 
conference in 1992, or advertising codes of conduct). In other cases, it blossoms as a response 
to the threat of command and control regulation (e.g. industry agreements on passive safety 
measures for cars; Responsible Care; the ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development; 
the global confectionary industry’s code of conduct banning forced child labour; or even the 
failed attempt to strike a co-regulatory deal to set pan-European, affordable roaming tariffs 
for the use of the mobile phone across EU member states).12 In yet another set of cases, 
private regulation takes the form of an industry association with a specific mission and a 
management board that even represents external interests, in order to ensure alignment with 
the public interest, often as a result from public opinion campaigns (so-called ‘naming and 
shaming’, sometimes also aimed at individual companies, such as Starbucks or Nestlé). 
Finally, in some cases private regulation simply hides a cartel (e.g. in antitrust cases such as 
i.a. Allied tube and cases of collective boycott involving industry associations) (Maher, 2011). 
Against this background, academics have traditionally shown very little faith in the virtues 
of private regulation: as observed by Anthony Ogus (1999)), “self-regulation, understood 
narrowly as law formulated by private agencies to govern professional and trading activities, 
has been rigorously criticized by lawyers and economists alike”. Some lawyers tend to see it 
as an example of modern corporatism, whereas economists tend to spot traces of collusion in 
most private regulatory schemes; political science frames private regulation either from the 
perspective of transaction cost politics, in which public policymakers delegate certain 
functions to private regulators (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Tuohy & Wolfson, 1978); or as 
the result of rent-seeking behaviour (Tullock, 1967). Overall, the potential for abuse has been 
                                                   
11 As reported by Vogel (2010), there are now more than 300 industry or product codes, nearly all of 
which address labour or environmental practices; many sectors and products are governed by 
multiple codes. More than 3,000 global firms now regularly issue reports on the social and 
environmental practices and many of these firms have developed their own codes and/or subscribe to 
one or more industry or cross-industry codes. The largest private business code, the UN Global 
Compact, has more than 3,500 corporate signatories. More than 2,300 global firms have endorsed the 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development developed by the International Chamber of Commerce 
and more than 46,000 firms have been certified as complaint with ISO 14001, an environmental 
process standard. More than 70 major global financial institutions from 16 countries, representing 
assets of $4.5 trillion, have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment. 
12 Responsible Care was adopted by several national chemical industry associations in part to forestall 
national laws establishing more stringent plant safety standards following the Union Carbide 
chemical plant explosion at Bhopal, India, in 1984. The International Chamber of Commerce’s 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development was initiated by global firms who feared that the 1992 
Rio “Earth Summit” would lead to an expansion of global environmental regulations. The global 
confectionary industry adopted a code of conduct banning forced child labour in part as a response to 
the threat of American trade sanctions on imports of cocoa from West Africa. During the 1990s, many 
apparel producers and retailers endorsed voluntary international labour standards to secure 
Congressional support for the renewal of China’s most favoured nation status as a trading partner. 
See Vogel (2010). 
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highlighted by scholars from all social sciences (Page, 1986; Cane, 1987; Harden & Lewis, 
1986; Ogus, 1995; Shaked & Sutton, 1981). At the same time, this traditional approach is 
believed to have been excessively partisan vis-à-vis private regulation: recent efforts to 
analyze the emergence of private regulatory schemes has led to a more nuanced and 
balanced approach to this form of governance, especially with respect to NGOs-driven 
private regulatory schemes and the growing number of multi-stakeholder initiatives at 
transnational level (Dixit, 2004; Cafaggi, 2005, 2006, 2010; Senden, 2005; Abbot & Snidal, 
2009s; Buthe, 2010; Büthe & Mattli, 2011). 
Today, the role of private governance schemes is again under the spotlight, mostly since 
traditional forms of public intervention are facing enormous, and probably insurmountable 
difficulties in coping with certain policy problems. The weaknesses of public regulation 
emerge more specifically at the transnational level where difficulties to coordinate, 
inconsistency between standard setting and enforcement, divergences between 
administrative and judicial enforcement and within the latter among domestic courts make 
transnational public regulation an insufficient response. We refer in particular to three 
outstanding policy domains.  
Firstly, there are goods and services that transcend national boundaries and as such do not 
lend themselves easily to direct regulation by national policy-makers. This is mostly the case 
of international public goods, (e.g. deforestation, emission reduction), for which international 
regulatory cooperation is heavily needed, in particular since absent coordination a ‘race to 
the bottom’ occurs, which can lead to disastrous outcomes such as a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Early experiences such as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) 
and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) have filled an enormous policy gap created by 
the lack of international cooperation. Only recently, as testified by forthcoming work at the 
OECD, the need to strengthen international regulatory cooperation has been placed under 
the spotlight in the global policy community.  
Secondly, there are markets that exhibit very fast-changing dynamics – so fast-changing that 
public policymakers become awkward when trying to regulate them. This is the case, in 
particular, of high-tech and knowledge-intensive markets, in which the fast pace of change 
and the highly technical nature of the information needed to regulate effectively leads 
policymakers with the need to rely on private parties, at least for the definition of 
implementing measures and technical specifications. Examples include, but are not limited 
to, standardization policy, international roaming, net neutrality regulation, cloud computing, 
privacy on the Internet, and Internet governance. 
Thirdly, as a residual category, there are policy problems that inevitably require heavy 
reliance on the expertise of private actors, since the latter are the most informed parties, or 
the best positioned players to fix a given failure, or simply the only parties holding control 
over given, essential resources. These fields include widely diverse policy domains, such as 
(again) financial risk regulation, but also sustainability reporting and critical infrastructure 
protection, in which an estimated 85% of critical infrastructure is in private hands (Renda, 
2010).  
Against this background, the origins of private governance schemes can be related to various 
causes and motivations, which can be broadly classified as follows.  
- Signalling and enhancing legitimacy. Some private governance schemes respond to 
signals sent by the market or by civil society (e.g. sustainability reporting, ethical trading, 
environmental protection and business ‘greenwashing’, respect of labour rights, child 
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labour etc.).13 These include schemes that emerge due to the need to sustainably govern 
common resources (e.g. in the case of the FSC and the MSC). 14  A specific type of 
signalling occurs when private actors seek to increase the legitimacy of their activities: for 
instance, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), when deciding to 
expand its scope into the area of social responsibility faced a number of obstacles, in 
particular concerning question of representation: given its traditional tendency towards 
involving mostly industrialized countries and businesses, ISO sought to involve other 
stakeholders by creating a system including six groups: Consumer, government, 
industry, labour, NGO, and others.15 Part of this more inclusive process was also the 
conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the relevant International 
Organizations in the area of social standard setting.16  Here, the need to ensure the 
legitimacy of the process and of the final outcome can be seen as one reason to engage 
into cooperation. 
- Controlling the value chain. Other schemes were created due to the need to control the 
supply chain, especially in the case of large retailers relying on local suppliers in 
countries with very weak rule of law (e.g. the GlobalGAP scheme, corporate social 
responsibility, food safety). In the area of food safety the adoption of the supply chain 
approach by public regulation earlier in Europe and later in the US has delegated and 
empowered large MNC with the regulatory power and responsibility to control safety 
along the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005; Cafaggi, 2012a). In the area of CSR codes are often 
implemented via contracting as illustrated by the case of private service military 
company and by private security services (Francioni & Ronzitti, 2011; Dickinson, 2011). 
- Efficiency, inter-firm coordination and co-opetition. Some forms of private governance 
are dictated by the need to enhance inter-firm coordination for pro-competitive purposes. 
This is typically the example of patent pools (Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Merges, 1996; Gallini, 
2011).  
- Reducing transaction costs through standardization. As an example, ISO and other 
technical standard setters engage into cooperation with more specialized technical 
regulators when necessary.17 In the area of social responsibility, interoperability seems to 
be of importance as well. As already outlined above, in the creation of ISO 26000 
                                                   
13 The term ‘greenwashing’ is used to refer to cases in which which green marketing is deceptively 
used to promote the perception that an organization's aims and policies are environmentally friendly. 
American environmentalist Jay Westerveld coined the term in 1986 in response to a hotel’s efforts to 
encourage guests to help the environment by reusing towels. See, for an application to the oil market, 
M.A. Cherry and J.F. Sneirson (2012), “Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of ‘Green Oil 
Companies’”, Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment, Vol. 3.  
14 See, for an introduction to the governance of common resources, van Waarden (2010). And for 
applications to the MSC and FSC, see Gale & Haward (2004) and Curtin & Senden (2011). 
15 See J. Diller, “Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking”, Pending Publication 33 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2011) at 11. 
16 Ibid., p. 16. 
17 See, e.g. the MoU between the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International 
Organization of Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) Concerning Standardization in the Field 
of Electronic Business (http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/e-business/files/mou.pdf); MoU between the 
International Union of Leather Technologists and Chemists and ISO on Cooperation in the 
Development of Standards Associated with the Testing of Tanned Leather and Tanning Products. See 
regarding cooperation agreements of CEN: 
(http://www.cen.eu/cen/AboutUs/CENnetwork/Relations/MoUs/Pages/default.aspx/). 
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considerable emphasis was put on ensuring the inter-operability of its own standards 
with already existing regulation in the area. Apart from the participation of a great 
number of organizations in the standard-setting process, ISO engaged in further 
cooperation regarding implementation. It signed, for instance, a MoU with the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), in order to ensure that businesses can better implement ISO 
26000 into their sustainability reporting within the GRI framework.18 Another way to 
reduce transaction costs is the avoidance or resolution of conflicts. Generally speaking, 
most cooperative forms include some conflict preventing elements, since they usually at 
least slightly curb the risk of conflict: entities create an environment where they have the 
opportunity to exchange information and to collaborate and thereby address emerging 
conflicts at a very early stage.19 They furthermore often provide for a harmonization of 
their regulatory approaches which also helps to avoid conflicts at an ex ante stage.20 
Finally, even though a private regulator might have the ability, as well as the competence 
to conduct a particular regulatory activity, it might be more efficient to engage into co-
operation with one of several other regulators. For example, if standards already exist, 
the costly process of drafting a new one could be saved. Moreover, regulatees would not 
have to adapt their activities (e.g. reporting) to yet another regulatory regime but could 
comply with the different standards emerging from different regimes without additional 
burden. Hence, from efficiency perspective there could be two incentives for regulators 
to cooperate with each other: First, to streamline and decrease the efforts and costs of the 
organization itself by merging capacities in the regulatory process, and secondly, to 
decrease effort and costs of the regulatees. 
- Complementing or pre-empting public regulation. Some private governance initiatives 
emerge as a complement to existing public policy, to facilitate implementation and 
compliance with existing public regulation. Institutional complementarity between 
private and public emerge at standard setting level, monitoring and enforcement 
(Cafaggi, 2006, 2010). This is the case, i.a. of the ‘new approach’ to standardization in 
force in the EU since Directive 98/34 of 22 June 1998) (Schepel, 2005). Also, to some 
extent GlobalGAP can be seen as complementing existing public regulation.21 To the 
contrary, some private governance schemes were created with a clear objective to pre-
empt and avoid public regulation. This approach is often labelled private regulation in 
the shadow of legislation (Héritier, 2002), and can be observed, inter alia, in several 
environmental regimes.  
- Quality and Effectiveness. Quality and Effectiveness can be important incentives for 
private regulatory cooperation on different stages of the regulatory process. At the 
standard setting stage cooperative agreements, in particular those dealing with technical 
                                                   
18 “The MoU is intended to leverage the activities of the two organizations related to reporting and 
benchmarking by business and on sustainable development by sharing information on ISO standards 
and GRI programmes, teaming up with other partners, participating in the development of new or 
revised documents, joint promotion and communication.” Information available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1460. 
19 See e.g. Articles 3 & 4 MoU between ILO/ISO and the MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights 
Owners. 
20 See e.g. the MoU between FELABAN/UNEP or the MoU between FAO/ILO. 
21 See i.a. Sorsa (2011), stating that “without GlobalGAP, farmers and exporters in DCs would have to 
come to grips themselves with complicated EU regulations on food safety and those of the member 
states as well”, and that in this sense, “private food schemes help to reduce the transaction costs by 
making information about European regulations on food safety systematically available and 
practically achievable”(http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1H4.pdf).  
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standard setting put significant emphasis on the desire to increase effectiveness through 
the common approach. 22  Cooperation allows these organizations to distribute the 
different tasks necessary in technical standardization processes and to avoid duplication 
of efforts. Moreover, a high number of cooperative projects, pursue the goal to streamline 
or harmonize existing standards in order to avoid duplication effects on their addresses.23 
Finally, it is also important to mention that cooperative approaches do not automatically 
increase effectiveness. The inclusion of a high number of stakeholders, the need to 
provide assistance, such as translations and other measures which might become 
necessary in a cooperative approach, can decelerate a standard setting process 
significantly and thus impact its effectiveness. 24  Cooperative approaches can also 
improve effectiveness of compliance mechanisms. Private regulation is often (not always) 
based on soft law mechanisms and voluntariness. Compliance is based on considerations 
such as cost-efficiency, self-interest, and reputational aspects. The later concerns, in 
particular, firms acting in markets with direct consumer contact. Necessary pressure may 
also originate from other private actors, such as investors or insures, or from the public 
side, such as national regulatory agencies. Under these conditions organizations and 
members to private organizations want create an environment where it is difficult for a 
single actor to not comply with a particular set of standards as this would close many 
economic possibilities. Against this background the question to be answered is in how far 
cooperation can positively impact compliance with the respective standards. To begin 
with, it has to be clarified that agreements very often only contain provisions that deal 
with the implementation of regulatory standards.25 Less common are provisions that 
explicitly stipulate cooperation regarding compliance mechanism or even enforcement.26 
An interesting exception is ISO26000, which had the incentive to provide a harmonized 
standard on social responsibility that would help organizations (in particular businesses) 
to comply with these obligations.27 Notable in this context is a provision from the MoU 
between ILO/ISO, which stipulates that ISO’s “activities … [will] [c]omplement the role 
of governments in ensuring compliance with international labour standards”.28 Hence 
through the cooperation with the industry-driven ISO, ILO is expecting also support the 
efforts to ensure compliance with its standards. Apart from this example a number of 
regulatory agreements are based on the intention to increase compliance with the 
involved regulatory regimes. Usually, however, this rationale is located more in the 
background and is only rarely mentioned explicitly in the MoUs themselves. 
- Collusion/mutual benefit. Some private governance arrangements can also hide strategic 
anti-competitive purposes, as is the case for collective boycott schemes and cartels. Also, 
existing (and often concealed) private agreements between content providers and ISPs 
                                                   
22 See MoU between IEC/ISO/ITU/UN-ECE; MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights Owners. 
23 See, e.g. the MoU between GRI/GC; see furthermore the MoU between LEI/FSC. 
24 An example for a very inclusive process is the creation of ISO 26000. See Diller, J. M., (2012), 
“Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 33, No. 3, Spring 2012, pp. 481-536. 
25 MoU between LEI/FSC; Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the MoU between IPL/UNEP, but see also the 
Alliance between GRI/GC, where it is stressed that the “GRI Sustainability Reporting Framework is a 
voluntary ESG reporting and stakeholder engagement and management tool and should not be viewed as a 
compliance framework”, available at: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/50-06-24-2010. 
26 See para. 18 MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights Owners.  
27  See http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_ 
responsibility/sr_iso26000_overview.htm 
28 Article 2.2.2 MoU between ILO/ISO. 
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for the purpose of enabling copyright infringement in cyberspace often go beyond what 
public regulation would entail, especially in terms of copyright scope and respect for 
user privacy and network neutrality.  
- Other Incentives. These include at least two additional reasons:  
o Broadening the scope of regulatory activities, e.g. as in the case of ISO, which expanded 
from pure technical standard setting into social responsibility. As this field was 
already occupied by a number of IOs, such as the UN, the OECD and the ILO, 
cooperation became a way to foster activities into the new area and to ensure that 
they fit within the already existing framework.  
Achieving Competitive Advantage. In case there are several regulators but not all of them 
engage into regulatory cooperation this could provide the ones participating with strategic 
advantages. They could have available more capacities, more members, regulatees, more 
beneficiaries, and potentially higher legitimacy and greater effectiveness. The new situation 
could trigger additional growth and could again be used for more and better regulation. On 
the downside, the additional power could also be exploited and the positive effects of 
competition could again be decelerated. Finally, standards could become diluted if too many 
interests have to be considered in the cooperative project. Empirical examples include the 
cooperation between FSC and LEI, which was reportedly triggered by the need to challenge 
competing organizations such as the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification 
(PEFC).29  The most appropriate public policy approach towards these various forms of 
private governance is of course different, depending on the motivation for its creation. This 
is why, in order to develop a theoretical framework for the assessment of private regulatory 
schemes, it is essential to develop a taxonomy of such schemes, so that tailored policy 
appraisal tools can be designed.  
1.1 Building a taxonomy of private governance  
As already recalled above, any attempt to reach a complete taxonomy of existing forms of 
private governance is inevitably doomed to remain incomplete. So far, authors such as 
Abbott & Snidal (2009b) have tried to reach an operational taxonomy by distinguishing 
existing schemes based on the nature of their participants. Figure 1 below shows their 
‘governance triangle’, in which a large number of governance organizations are located 
along a triangular space based on the relative prevalence of State actors, NGOs or private 
firms. In addition, we have highlighted a number of areas, namely the area of business 
associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, which produce relevant 
private regulation i.a. in the form of codes of conducts; and the top area of the triangle, 
which hosts forms of International Regulatory Cooperation such as the OECD and other 
forms, which the OECD itself is currently studying. Most of the private governance schemes 
we have been discussing and defining in the previous pages are anyway located in the 
middle-lower area of the triangle: in the figure, we have highlighted the Forest Stewardship 
Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, and the Global Reporting Initiative.  
                                                   
29  See Frequently Asked Questions Memorandum of Understanding between FSC and LEI 
(http://www.fsc.org/fileadmin/web-data/public/document_center/News/Press_releases/FSC-SS-
2010-07-14-LEI_FSC_MoU_FAQ-EN.pdf). 
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Figure 1. The governance triangle in Abbot and Snidal (2009b) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on Abbott & Snidal (2009b). 
However, the taxonomy developed by Abbott & Snidal (2009b) based on the nature of 
participants provides an insufficient basis for the evaluation of the effectiveness and the 
welfare-enhancing nature of private governance schemes. More recent attempts by the same 
authors have led to the definition of a different framework, which refers to the phases of the 
policy cycle carried out by the scheme under scrutiny. Figure 2 below shows an elaboration 
on the so-called ANIME framework, which distinguishes between forms of private 
governance and the phases of the policy cycle in which these forms become active. Under 
this theoretical framework, some private governance schemes focus on specific steps of the 
policy process, such as enforcement and compliance. One typical example is conservation 
and land trusts, or forms of regulation by contract that aim mostly at fostering compliance 
where litigation would prove costly, unpredictable or simply impossible. Other forms of 
private regulation mostly focus on the setting of technical standards, as is the case of CSR 
schemes incorporating ISO standards. Other organizations focus either on the 
implementation of existing public regulation, or on monitoring and compliances. To the 
contrary, there are some types of organizations that replace public policy in all its aspects, 
including the setting of the over-arching agenda in a given policy field.  
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Figure 2. Functional typologies: the ANIME framework 
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1.2 Regulation as a form of public-private cooperation: a transaction cost 
politics approach 
From a theoretical perspective, the emergence of private schemes that govern private 
behaviour beyond, and often independently of, public legislation can be approached from a 
variety of perspectives – although in reality, almost none of them has been fully applied to 
this issue. First, an important precondition for delegating the achievement of public policy 
goals to private governance is a vision of the ‘art of the state’ that is focused on facilitating 
the interaction of private parties, rather than on command and control regulation. This is 
typically a legacy of the work of Ronald Coase (1960) and, even more importantly, the 
subsequent elaboration by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed (1972), which led to the 
identification of certain private institutions – so-called ‘rule 4’ organizations – that emerge 
with the specific purpose to reallocate entitlements and thus save on transaction costs 
(Ayres, 2005; Roberts, 2011). In addition, the literature on the optimal governance of common 
resources suggests that private parties can interact to efficiently correct market failures and 
optimize governance of common resources, avoiding risk of depletion (Hardin, 1968; Heller, 
2008; Ostrom, 1990 and 2005). 
But even more notably, a very useful way of looking at the potential for private regulation to 
achieve public policy goals is an adaptation of the ‘Williamsonian’, ‘make or buy’ approach, 
which sees private governance as the result of an implicit decision to externalize a given 
phase of the policy process. Just like private businesses decide whether to insource or out-
source a give part of the production process based on a comparison between administrative 
costs and transaction costs, the choice of private regulation would emerge in a policy 
decision only where evidence suggests that this is the most cost-effective way of achieving a 
given policy outcome; or whenever this option maximizes net benefits. In choosing private 
regulation, then governments should take into account the public interest – something for 
which it was democratically appointed. 
From a more theoretical standpoint, private regulation can thus emerge in two main forms: i) 
when civil society directly empowers private regulators for the achievement of socially 
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desirable results (see e.g. Ostrom 1999); and ii) when civil society ‘delegates’ regulatory 
powers to government, and the latter decides to delegate regulatory activities to private 
players through self- or co- regulation. In this latter case a ‘double delegation’ scenario 
occurs, where delegation by government is based on different rationales compared to the 
initial delegation made by civil society. When this happens, government must also guarantee 
the achievement of public policy goals by creating and implementing monitoring 
mechanisms and procedures, which become a safeguard for civil society as a whole.  
This view is consistent with the view adopted by the ‘transaction cost politics’ approach, in 
which the regulatory activity is seen as a principal-agent problem, where the principal 
(government or Parliament) delegates regulatory power to an agent (public or private); and 
the latter regulates under the supervision of the former (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). In our 
case, the ultimate principal is always civil society: governments are agents with respect to 
citizens, and become principals when delegating powers to public agencies, ministers, or 
private regulators. At the same time, this approach is consistent with the so-called 
‘institutional complementarity’ concept developed in comparative law and institutional 
analysis (Aoki, 2001; Cafaggi, 2006 and 2010). This implies that public and private regulation 
emerge through co-evolution patterns, which ultimately select ‘who does what’ to address 
societal problems (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002). In our case, most co-evolution mechanisms do 
not select either public or private regulation: rather, in most cases the two interact and merge 
into hybrid forms, where some of the phases of the policy cycle are performed by delegated 
political agents; and other by private parties.  
Against this background, private regulation can prove more effective than public regulation 
for a number of reasons: for example, according to Coglianese et al. (2004), self-regulatory 
schemes possess a number of potential advantages over command and control regulation, 
such as i) proximity (being closer to the industry being regulated); ii) flexibility (absence of 
political and administrative constraints); iii) greater compliance; and iv) greater potential to 
mobilize resources. Potential disadvantages include conflicts of interest, inadequate 
enforcement and accountability, and insufficient monitoring of compliance. From the 
perspective of internal governance, Balleisen & Eisner (2009) argue that “the effectiveness of 
private regulation in a particular context – or, more precisely, the potential for credible co-
regulation – depends on the following five factors: 1) the depth of concern for their 
reputation among regulated businesses; 2) the relevance of flexibility in regulatory detail; 3) 
the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity and autonomy on the part of 
nongovernmental regulators; 4) the degree of transparency in regulatory process; and 5) the 
seriousness of accountability. Before legislators or regulatory agencies choose to delegate 
regulatory authority to industry organizations or corporations, they should assess the 
regulatory lay of the land with respect to each of these issues”. 
This theoretical approach enables a better understanding of the diverse combinations of 
public and private regulation that can be observed and designed in the real world: from pure 
command and control regulation to hybrid forms of public-private cooperation and ‘new 
approaches’, to purely private schemes (Cafaggi, 2006 and 2010). From this perspective, it 
becomes clear that for any private governance scheme to be viable from a public policy 
perspective, regardless of whether it is a spontaneous scheme or a policy-induced scheme, a 
suitable monitoring mechanism must in be in place for public policymakers to be able to 
observe whether the behaviour of private regulators is sufficiently aligned with the public 
interest: the development of a framework for evaluating private governance in the form of 
self- or co-regulatory schemes is the overarching goal of this paper. Section 2 below deals 
with the definition of the key features of private regulation, focusing in particular on the 
effectiveness dimension. Section 3 outlines a potential theoretical framework for the 
incorporation of ad hoc assessment tools in the EU policy process.  
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2. Evaluating private governance: a focus on effectiveness 
In the past two decades, significant effort has been devoted to the definition of the key 
features of private governance schemes, and in particular those adopted within trans-
national private regulation. In the academic literature, four key dimensions are normally 
identified (see Cafaggi, 2010): quality, legitimacy, enforcement and effectiveness. Quality is 
normally measured in terms of the traditional criteria applied to formal legislation, i.e. 
certainty, predictability, lack of ambiguity, flexibility, efficacy, malleability etc. These 
potentially conflicting requirements imply that high quality norms will often occupy the 
middle ground between both extremes. Moreover, good-quality private norms should also 
not upset the coherency of existing, usually formal, regulatory system(s).30 
Legitimacy, on the other hand, is often described as referring to the degree of responsiveness, 
inclusiveness and representativeness of the private regulatory scheme. It includes both a 
substantive and procedural dimension. Authors have distinguished i.a. between political 
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy (Bernstein, 2011); as well as between input and output 
legitimacy; 31  or the emerging ‘derivative legitimacy’ in times of extensive interlinking 
between private regulatory bodies (Kelly, 2008). Established theories of legitimacy consider 
whether the organizations are representative, inclusive and procedurally fair. Private 
regulatory organizations that satisfy the legitimacy criteria articulated in these theories can 
claim legitimacy and expect greater compliance as a result (Curtin & Senden, 2011; Casey & 
Scott, 2011). 
A variety of enforcement mechanisms exist with regard to private norms, such as arbitration, 
mediation, incorporation in court decisions as well as more sociologically informed methods 
(i.e., forms of peer pressure, market-based strategies using reputation and ‘naming and 
shaming’ mechanisms). Enforcement is often the outcome of complementary strategies 
deploying judicial and non-judicial mechanisms across different jurisdictional levels 
(Cafaggi, 2011a). Moreover, enforcement of private norms must be considered in relation to 
public regulation and public oversight. There is an increasing role of agencies in overseeing 
compliance with transnational standard setting: examples range from accounting standards 
to advertising, from payment to food safety, from employment to non discrimination 
standards. To what extent is or should the state be involved in enforcing private norms? 
How do norm conflicts between public and private norms affect the process of enforcement? 
Finally, effectiveness can be defined as the consistency between means and goals and extent to 
which private regulation achieves its objectives. Effectiveness ‘measures’ ex ante the 
proportionality between means and ends and ex post the positive or negative impact of the 
regulatory measure over the different constituencies including regulated parties and 
beneficiaries. It concerns the entire regulatory process from standard-setting to enforcement. 
Effectiveness can be predicated upon either private as well as public norms, or as often 
happens, a combination of both. Indeed, one of the cardinal issue raised in this paper is 
which type of norms, or which combination of norms and institutions (as well as under 
which circumstances), leads to the highest degree of effectiveness, i.e. the highest degree of 
                                                   
30 A private norm may be particularly effective and of high quality, yet still conflict with existing 
regulatory regimes, e.g. other private or public regimes. 
31 ‘Input legitimacy’ focuses on the means by which constituents participate in a private regulatory 
scheme, e.g. representation, inclusiveness or process. Output-legitimacy represents those paradigms 
that focus on substantive outcomes, e.g. trade liberalization, or fairness, and whether goals set by the 
private regulatory scheme are reached. In this respect, output legitimacy is very similar to 
effectiveness. See Scharpf (1999) and 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Paper-Elsig-Amalric.pdf  
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compliance with the stated objectives. Often the correlation between norms and institutions 
is not sufficiently highlighted and effectiveness is measured in relation to norms regardless 
of the institutional framework. The OECD (2011) approach suggests on the contrary that 
effectiveness should be evaluated in the light of an integrated analysis including rules and 
institutions. 
As a matter of fact, these four dimensions are tightly interrelated, to the extent that 
disentangling them can prove very challenging. To be sure, there are significant 
interdependencies between them: legitimacy can foster compliance, which facilitates 
enforcement and ultimately increases effectiveness; effectiveness, in turn, contributes to 
legitimacy (so-called ‘output’ legitimacy). However, this interrelation includes important 
conflicts and trade-offs: for example, improving legitimacy through representation, voice 
and accountability can in some cases undermine effectiveness by increasing transaction and 
compliance costs, slowing down the regulatory process, diluting enforcement and ossifying 
private rules.32 In other circumstances higher efficiency reducing externalities can improve 
legitimacy.  
From the viewpoint of a participant to a private regulatory scheme, the key dimension is 
effectiveness, defined as the extent to which the organization achieves its own stated goals. 
This, in turn, can be obtained through high-quality norms that are strongly enforced, and 
through a high degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, can increase the likelihood that 
other participants will respect the rules of the private organization: in this respect, legitimacy 
can transform private rules into ‘focal points’, thence reducing transaction costs and making 
the success of an organization more likely.33  
The effectiveness of private regulation can be described in analytical terms as a function of 
output, outcome and impact (Easton, 1965; Fuchs, 2006), plus broader political and socio-
economic effects (Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010 and Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). More 
precisely, the output is the direct result of the activity carried out by the private regulatory 
scheme, such as a standard, a set of rules or a specific policy. The outcome refers to the 
overall regulatory objectives, including the behavioural changes of regulated and third 
parties that occur as a result of the activity undertaken. Finally, if one looks also at the 
broader social, economic and environmental consequences of the activity carried out by the 
private regulators, then the ‘impact’ of private regulation emerges. These determinants of 
effectiveness can in turn be broken down based on their main drivers. Accordingly, output 
can be described along the dimensions of stringency and comprehensiveness,34 outcome can 
be explained through the degree of compliance with the rules, the participation of 
stakeholders (inclusiveness, representativeness) and the existence of potential lock-in effects 
due, e.g. to reliance on one specific standard in a context of quick technological development. 
Finally, the impact of a private regulatory scheme refers to its added value in achieving its 
objectives compared to the counterfactual, i.e. the next best alternative to that form of private 
regulatory scheme. Beyond the impact of private regulation in terms of ‘problem-solving’, 
some authors (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2007; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2010) have further 
                                                   
32 See partly Kelly (2008). On the concept of ossification, see McGarity (1987) and Cafaggi (2011a). 
33 See Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2010), quoting also Cutler et al. (1999).  
34 Stringency, as reported in Fuchs and Kalfagianni (2010), refers to the degree to which a given 
private governance scheme requires actors to implement behavioural changes (Auld et al., 2008). At 
the same time, stringency differs according to whether management-system-based or performance 
standards are adopted, and the ambition of performance standards (Fuchs, 2006). 
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distinguished between measures of success such as: material and structural effects, cognitive 
effects, and normative effects.35  
When looking at the interface between public and private regulation, however, these 
concepts are not sufficient to provide policymakers with a comprehensive theoretical 
framework. 36  In particular, public policymakers are normally interested in a different 
outcome, which certainly encompasses, but is not limited to, legitimacy and effectiveness.37 
From a transaction cost politics perspective (see section 1.2 above), public policy-makers will 
opt for delegating the solution of a given policy problem to private regulation whenever this 
represents the most ‘effective’ way to achieve that goal. However, this notion of effectiveness 
(defined as the extent to which private regulatory schemes achieve socially optimal or 
desirable outcomes38) may be different from the one sought by private actors involved in 
private regulatory schemes. Occasionally, these two notions of effectiveness can coincide; but 
in many instances they may diverge – hence the scepticism of many social scientists when it 
comes to evaluating private regulation.  
Cases in which ‘private’ and ‘social’ effectiveness diverge can be of many different types. For 
example, collective action in private regulatory bodies can aim at socially sub-optimal 
outcomes. For example, a cartel can be very effective in achieving its stated goal but 
externalize costs on third parties.39 Participants would join the cartel to the extent that they 
think the cartel is likely to be successful, i.e. would achieve its goal of increasing participants’ 
profits without being uncovered by antitrust authorities. However, from a public policy 
perspective a cartel is undesirable since it leads to restrictions of output and/or increases in 
price levels, to the detriment of consumers and often also other actors along the value chain.  
                                                   
35 Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2010) refer to first-order and second-order effects to distinguish between 
impacts and material, cognitive and normative effects. 
36 It is important to observe that different private governance schemes can define effectiveness in 
different ways: for example, emerging definitions given by ISEAL and the GFSI differ noticeably from 
the ones given by multi-national corporations for the purposes of their own CSR activity. But 
generally, one can say that effectiveness is always defined as the ability of a given private governance 
scheme to achieved its own statutory goal.  
37 Effectiveness is not commonly used in ex ante RIA, although recently the European Commission has 
started using effectiveness as a criterion against which to rank and discard options before a more in-
depth analysis. In this context, effectiveness is used in combination with other two criteria 
(“efficiency” and “coherence”). To the contrary, the notion of “effectiveness” in public policy appraisal 
is mostly used in ex post evaluation, where the quality and performance of a given piece of legislation 
is appraised in terms of “relevance” (i.e. the extent to which the objectives of public intervention 
proved appropriate with respect to the funds available, the needs perceived and the specific problems 
the intervention was meant to solve); “efficiency” (i.e. “cost-effectiveness”, or how economically have 
the various inputs been converted into outputs and results and whether the expected effects have been 
obtained at a reasonable cost); “usefulness” (i.e. whether the impacts achieved by an intervention 
correspond to the needs and problems identified at the outset); and finally “effectiveness” (i.e. the 
extent to which the effects of a given programme have contributed to the achievement of the specific 
objectives of the intervention. 
38 This is why effectiveness is normally linked to explicitly stated general, specific and operational 
objectives in the ex ante IAs of the European Commission. The specification of objectives has become 
much more common in Commission IAs over the past few years, and the Communication on smart 
regulation of October 2010 placed even more emphasis on the need to define “SMART” objectives in 
ex ante policy appraisal documents, so that achievement of those objectives can be monitored over 
time, including in ex post evaluation.  
39 See Maher (2011). 
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A more general case is that of negative externalities, i.e. cases in which the coordination of 
activities between members of a private regulatory scheme leads to non-internalized 
negative effects on non-members, even if such effects are unintentional. This is even more 
likely to be the case whenever the governance of private regulatory organizations is not 
inclusive of all potentially affected stakeholders – as we explain in section 2 below, 
GlobalGap is an example of under-representation of developing countries, which end up 
being negatively affected by the activity of the private regulatory body.  
Another problem may emerge whenever the scope of the private regulatory scheme is 
narrower than the impacts generated by the activity of its participants: for example private 
regulation aimed at compliance with safety standards might have, say, unintended 
environmental consequences; private regulation of Internet security standards might affect 
the users’ freedom of expression or their right to privacy (Cafaggi, 2011b).  
Finally, there might be cases in which the private regulatory scheme is aimed at achieving 
socially desirable outcomes, but either adverse selection problems or lack of monitoring and 
compliance lead to the emerge of socially undesirable outcomes. An example is provided by 
Lennox & Nash (2003), who describe the Responsible Care initiative launched by the 
Chemical Manufacturer’s Association (CMA) in 1989 in response to growing public criticism 
of the industry: the fact that the CMA did not require third party review or certification of 
firm performance and did not adopt explicit sanctions for non-compliance led to a perverse 
situation in which participants in Responsible Care were more polluting on average than 
other chemical firms in the United States. 40  Similarly, Morgenstern & Pizer (2007) in 
reviewing a number of voluntary programs in the environmental field express concern on 
the self-selection of participants into those schemes.  
The potential misalignment between private benefits and social welfare can be addressed by 
designing appropriate indicators that would make ex ante clear when regulatory choices 
pursue one or the other strategy. Some sectoral experiences (advertising, environment) and 
some general guidelines (GRI, ISEAL) suggest that two families of indicators can provide 
guidance to align private benefits and social welfare: governance and performance 
indicators. For example governance indicators may refer to the separation of functions 
between standard setting, monitoring and enforcement. Private regulators that concentrate 
the functions in one single body tend to maximize private benefits exacerbating conflicts of 
interest between regulators and the regulated; those which separate them by creating 
independent monitors and enforcers increase the chances of internal conflict but open 
themselves to external voice ensuring higher level of transparency. Evidence shows that 
separation can also help regulatory dialogue when private enforcers send signals to standard 
setters about problems concerning compliance rather than focus on punishment of the 
infringers.41  
Regulatory objectives can be complex and sometimes conflicting. Conflicts may arise 
between private benefits and social welfare and even within social welfare when different 
                                                   
40 M. Lennox and J. Nash (2003), “Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection”, Business Strategy 
and the Environment, 12: 1-14. Responsible Care has operated up to now without explicit sanctions for 
malfeasance. As a result, it has reportedly fallen victim to enough opportunism that it includes a 
disproportionate number of poor performers, and its members do not improve faster than non-
members. Thus, the institutional pressure that Responsible Care exerts on its members appears to 
have inadequately counteracted opportunism. Since Responsible Care represents a leading example of 
self-regulation in the world, our findings highlight the difficulty of creating self-regulation without 
explicit sanctions. 
41 See F. Cafaggi (ed.) (2012), The enforcement of transnational regulation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2012 
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distributional outcomes may be generated by alternative regulatory strategies. Performance 
indicators can contribute to define ex ante distributional effects singling out winners and 
losers or benefits and costs of a specific regulatory measure. By highlighting these 
consequences they empower the regulator with information to make informed choices about 
conflicting objectives.42  
Besides these ‘genetic problems’, which depend on statutory goals, the selection of 
participants and the multi-stakeholder nature of the initiative, a number of other effects can 
undermine the alignment between private benefits and social goals during the life of a 
private regulatory body. Below, we briefly list them: 
 Lock-in effects and collective action problems can occur when members remain locked 
into suboptimal agreements and ‘focal points’, with no incentive to change;  
 Path dependency, status quo bias, anchoring and framing effects may lead to shifting 
focus towards measurable and immediate benefits rather than long-term social welfare; 
 Hard-to-detect changes over time might be induced by the prevalence of some interests 
over others during the life of the private regulatory body (e.g. MSC, see below) 
 Divergence of interests between the regulators and the regulated, which lead the former 
to prefer short-term actions that maximize their likelihood of being re-appointed;  
 Self-indulgence in the evaluation of private regulatory bodies, when governance 
arrangements entail self-evaluation, or lack of legitimacy of third parties in charge of 
evaluation.  
All these problems deserve careful scrutiny before one can actually conclude that a given 
policy issue is a good candidate for efficient and socially effective private regulation.43 
3. Towards a theoretical framework for the appraisal of private 
governance schemes 
The fact that private governance schemes can feature limited alignment with public policy 
goals raises the issue of how to evaluate them, when, and how. Again, from our ‘transaction 
cost politics’ approach, the evaluation phase of policymaking can be performed centrally by 
government, or delegated to specific agencies, or even externalized to private governance 
schemes themselves, or private meta-regulators. In all these hypotheses, independence is a 
key factor to ensure effectiveness. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a lot more self-
evaluation by private regulators today, than external evaluation by public policymakers. 
This creates concern, since there is evidence that private regulators, in many circumstances, 
                                                   
42 David Vogel (2010) has recently looked at this notion of effectiveness in the field of CSR, by arguing: 
“When compared to most government regulations in developed countries, civil regulation is clearly 
less effective. In fact, civil regulations exhibit many of the well-documented shortcomings of industry 
self-regulation at the national level, with whom they share many important characteristics (Lennox & 
Nash, 2003; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007). Both remain weaker than well-enforced command and 
control regulations in forcing corporations to change their behaviour … But the effectiveness of civil 
regulations is roughly comparable to that of many intergovernmental treaties and agreements, whose 
effectiveness in addressing environmental protection, labour practices, and human rights is also 
mixed and uneven … [and] civil regulations are undoubtedly more effective than the labour, human 
rights, and environmental regulations of many developing countries.” 
43 For example, Ashby et al. (2004) distinguished a number of voluntary regulatory schemes in the UK 
based on the different context in which they emerge, which in turn determines a different mode of 
strategic interaction between private players. Accordingly, they define the UK advertising Code as an 
Assurance Game, the UK Press as a Chicken game and the UK Life Insurance as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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can have limited incentives to fully self-evaluate their effectiveness from a social welfare 
perspective. At the same time, concerns become even bigger since the use of RIA and ex post 
evaluation tools to assess the effectiveness of private governance schemes appears very 
limited and unsophisticated. 
Examples are found in a number of fields. For example, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) reporting is today an enormous success as well as a profitable business for 
intermediaries and assurance consultants that help companies comply with internationally 
established standards. 44  Business codes such as the Business Charter for Sustainable 
Development developed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are followed by 
thousands of companies.45 Against this background, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
sustainability reporting is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to establish complex and 
meaningful international standards for the respect of sustainable development principles46. 
However, even if it appears as the prototype of an open, inclusive organization whose 
mandate and statutory objectives are aligned with public policy goals, its performance 
exhibited so far remarkable problems that are relevant from a public policy perspective 
(Vogel, 2010; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Fonseca, 2010; Wood, 2006). In 
addition, the formalistic nature of indicators has reportedly led to the emergence of box-
ticking behaviours on the side of companies participating to the reporting scheme; in the case 
of key aspects of sustainability, such as human rights, this has so far created enormous 
problems.47 Even more worryingly, the concerns expressed by stakeholders as regards the 
inclusiveness and external effectiveness of the current GRI-G3 set of indicators do not seem 
to have been the focus of a real reflection inside GRI, if not limited to the organization’s 
generic commitment towards constant improvement. The consequence of this rising 
discontent seems to be the creation of an additional organization, the International 
Integrated Reporting Committee, with the aim to create a globally accepted reporting 
framework that enables organizations to combine financial and non-financial disclosures.  
In the field of trade, the Base Code of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) is today the 
globally accepted benchmark of many workplace labour standards: in 2009 is applied to 9.4 
million workers at 34,720 supplier sites. Its enforcement and evaluation proceeds through 
inspections at the workplace, and ETI members are required to monitor compliance at their 
supplier sites against each Base Code Provision. Despite being a successful initiative, also 
thanks to the official endorsement of the UK DFID,48 ETI still features difficulties in the 
                                                   
44 As reported by Vogel (2010), “more than 3,000 global firms now regularly issue reports on the social 
and environmental practices and many of these firms have developed their own codes and/or 
subscribe to one or more industry or cross-industry codes”. See Wood, at 276-277 for a detailed 
description of the emergence of environmental reporting.  
45  For interesting accounts of the emergence of voluntary codes in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, see i.a. Wood (2006).  
46 The GRI is a private transnational body that has produced the leading standard for sustainability 
reporting, used by more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies. Its guidelines 
include 79 indicators for corporations to report on their social, environmental, and economic 
performance 
47 Fonseca (2010) has carried out an empirical analysis among stakeholders to collect feedback on their 
level of satisfaction with the GRI scheme, finding evidence of an excessive focus on internal 
organisational performance, rather than external impacts; a lack of integrated indicators; a “credibility 
gap” due to the discretion left to reporting firms as to whether to rely on internal or external assurance 
and verification; a worrying lack of guidance on stakeholder engagement, which ultimately results in 
limited participation and lack of real inclusiveness. 
48 ETI was initially funded by the UK DFID. Although ETI aims at long-term financial independence, 
funding from DFID has increased in the past years, and accounted for 40.1% of the organization’s 
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assessment of corporate behaviour, problems of representation of stakeholder groups 
(especially with respect to the ‘North-South’ divide and the representation of workers, see 
Hale, 2000 and Hale & Shaw, 2001); unequal power structures between UK retailers and 
suppliers from developing countries (Hughes, 2001); and the persistence of imbalances of 
bargaining power between corporations, workers and trade unions (Schaller, 2007). In any 
case, it is difficult to assess whether ETI is being evaluated from the standpoint of its social 
impacts: internal governance appears very balanced but also inevitably loose, with no strong 
monitoring and sanction mechanisms linked to any measure of external effectiveness.  
In food retail, since the 1990s (also due to scandals such as the BSE, or mad cow disease) 
multi-national corporations and international organizations have intensified their dialogue 
to create global safety standards. Private regulatory schemes such as i.a. IFOAM, the Global 
Food Safety Initiative, the Sustainable Agriculture Network and the Global Partnership for 
Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP); and sectoral initiatives such as the Forestry 
Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, the Aquaculture Certification 
Council, etc. have increasingly permeated the supply chain. However, problems have 
emerged due to divergences between the private benefit of members, and the social impacts 
of these initiatives. For example, in evaluating GlobalGAP,49 Fuchs & Kalfagianni (2010) have 
described a very Europe-dominated, business-dominated private regulatory scheme, with 
outstanding problems in terms of: i) limited inclusiveness; ii) a very limited participation of 
external stakeholders; iii) a very geographically biased representation in decision-making 
bodies; iv) a trade-off between stringency and uptake (GlobalGAP had to release certain 
requirements in order to elicit more participation); v) a lack of detail, which makes a true 
evaluation of progress achieved impossible;50 vi) a lack of progress tracking in terms of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
income in 2009. DFID assesses the merit of its PPA with ETI also on the basis of specific indicators. 
This, however, takes place merely through a self-assessment document filed by ETI. It is important to 
reflect on the peculiar type of public-private interaction that takes place between DFID and ETI: the 
fact that a public body oversees (though through self-assessment) and significantly contributes 
financially to a private regulatory scheme makes the ETI a hybrid type of institution, and more similar 
to a public-private partnership than to a full-fledged private regulation. That said, the endorsement 
(de facto and through funding) of the DFID seems to have encouraged trust and participation by all 
types of stakeholders, including businesses, trade unions and international organizations. ETI now 
counts 64 companies, 9 trade unions, and 15 NGOs and specifically looks at respect for workers’ rights 
and the maintenance of decent working conditions. 
49 GlobalGap was developed in 1997 by a group of European retailers. Initially focused on fruits and 
vegetables, it now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as well. Businesses wishing to 
acquire certification with GlobalGAP are required to comply with a detailed checklist of 254 questions, 
divided into 41 ‘‘major musts’’, 122 ‘‘minor musts’’ and 91 ‘‘shoulds’’ (recommended criteria). In 2008, 
it had 94,000 certified producers, up from 18,000 in 2004, representing an increase of approximately 80 
percent. More than 20 countries joined in 2008. In total, over 85 countries are represented. There is 
significant growth within European countries, particularly due to French and German supermarkets 
managing to reach out to more producers (GlobalGAP 2009, 21.09.09). Significant growth is also seen 
within countries that hold a (major) global supply position in produce, mainly South Africa and Chile. 
Smaller growth is observed in Central and Eastern Europe, Central America and some African 
countries (ibid.). 
50 This is the case for i.a. environmental well-being indicators such as the quality of irrigation water 
(except for sewage water which is a major must in all versions), recycling and re-use, impact of 
farming on the environment and wildlife and conservation policies, while constituted minor musts in 
2001, are mere recommendations in 2004 and remain so today (see also van der Grijp et al., 2005). This 
has occurred in other private initiatives, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), where the 
participation of big retailers led to the introduction of varying levels of stringency in the FSC due to 
the inability to meet the market demand of their supply chains (van Waarden, 2010). 
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evaluation of ‘external’ effectiveness; and vii) a potentially negative impact on competition 
and local firms (in Africa, several companies reportedly had to close their business due to the 
impossibility to match GlobalGAP standards). The European Commission also found that 
GlobalGAP imposes disproportionate costs on operators in developing countries.51  
Also more sectoral initiatives such as the FSC and the MSC have been heavily criticized in 
the past years. Despite their attempts to signal attention for external impacts, they have met 
with increasing skepticism on the side of stakeholders. The FSC, in particular, has been 
extensively reviewed in the academic literature, which showed that the initial thrust towards 
forest preservation has gradually shifted due to growing capture by business interests, 
geographic imbalances and reduced de facto representation of NGOs and other stakeholders.  
3.1 The rise of private meta-regulators 
The growing importance of private regulation in fields such as sustainability and food 
quality and safety, coupled with the rising concerns that such organizations do not fully 
pursue public goals, recently led to the creation of meta-organizations and – even more 
recently – meta-standardization as a way to bridge the gap between private regulatory 
schemes and public policymakers. An important example in this respect is certainly the 
ISEAL Alliance, an international non-profit organisation that codifies best practices for the 
design and implementation of social and environmental standards initiatives. This is a 
landmark example of what we call a ‘private meta-regulator’.52 In its activity as a ‘standard 
for standards’, the ISEAL alliance develops codes of good practice that seem to be reaching 
out to international organization and important supranational institutions. Important 
recognitions have come recently from the European Commission in its Communication on 
Fair Trade (2009); from the UNCTAD Recommendations of the conference “Making 
Sustainability Standards Work for Small-scale Farmers”; from the European Parliament’s 
resolution on “Corporate Social Responsibility: Implementing the Partnership for Growth 
and Jobs”53; from the WWF/World Bank “Forest Certification Assessment Guide” published 
in 2006; and from FAO’s Guidelines on Ecolabelling of Marine Fishery Products (2005). The 
                                                   
51 See SEC(2009)670, 28 May 2009: “Costs and benefits of participating in the GLOBALGAP assurance 
scheme to operators in developing countries have been estimated for Kenya, Zambia and Uganda. In 
general, the studies conclude that small-scale growers need external support (by donors or exporters) 
to be able to afford certification, costs of which in the case of Kenya are in the range of 636 GBP for 
establishment and 175 GBP per annum to maintain. In Zambia, establishment costs per grower even 
amounted to 4664 GBP for initial investment and 938 GBP per annum for maintenance costs. In 
Uganda, the study concludes that an export company would have to sell an additional 53 tonnes of 
horticultural products to break even (18% more for a company exporting 300 tonnes per annum). 
Farmers would have to increase their production by about 0.1 to 0.3 acres to compensate for additional 
costs through higher net income.” 
52 ISEAL Alliance members includes both the FSC and the MSC, who committed to compliance with 
the Code of ISEAL Good Practice. Other founding members include Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO), the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the 
International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS); the Marine Aquarium Council (MAC); the 
Rainforest Alliance; Social Accountability International (SAI); Social Accountability Accreditation 
Services (SAAS), the Union for Ethical BioTrade (UEBT) and UTZ Certified. To become a full member 
of the ISEAL Alliance, members have to demonstrate full compliance with ISEAL Codes of Good 
Practice and other applicable ISO Guides (e.g. ISO17011 for Accreditation Bodies). Organisations 
interested in membership will first apply for Associate Membership, and have to successfully 
complete a pre-assessment. ISEAL has historically relied upon three sources of funding – 
governmental agencies, foundations and membership fees. It works in partnership with 
AccountAbility and PwC Germany to improve its global outreach. 
53 Resolution P6_TA(2007)0062, 2007). 
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European Environmental Bureau (2010) declared in 2010 that they “consider [ISEAL's 
Standard-Setting Code] a model of reference for multi-stakeholder processes, especially in 
the area of public policy implementation”.  
Besides a Standard-Setting code and an Assurance Code, recently the ISEAL alliance 
launched an important tool that goes in the direction of an evaluation of the external impact 
of private regulatory bodies. The Code of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social 
and Environmental Standard (‘Impacts Code’) sets out the process by which standards 
systems can provide evidence of their contributions to social and environmental impacts as 
well as learning about and improving the effectiveness of their system. Interestingly, the 
Code appears strikingly similar to an Impact Assessment guidance developed by public 
policymakers.54  
Figure 3 below shows the theoretical framework for evaluation proposed by the ISEAL 
Impacts Code, which mirrors existing methods of ex post evaluation of projects, expenditure 
programmes and policies by public bodies. For example, the MSC has recently launched a 
consultation on the evaluation of its effectiveness and outcomes based on the ISEAL code55. 
There, the MSC has proposed to use the ISEAL Impacts Code, by identifying specific goals 
and issues for its own sector.  
Figure 3. Methodology for the evaluation based on the ISEAL code 
 
Source: ISEAL Impacts Code. 
The development of an Impacts Code on the side of the ISEAL Alliance certainly fills a gap in 
the international policy and global governance debate, which culminates in the lack of a 
suitable definition of sustainability. In this respect, ISEAL has gone even further by engaging 
with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the quest for a globally accepted 
definition of sustainability. As a matter of fact, while the ISEAL Impacts Code primarily 
looks at the stakeholder of a given private governance scheme (e.g. the MSC), the conceptual 
                                                   
54 Users can find definitions, glossaries, methodologies and tips for use of data sources and monitoring 
and evaluation arrangements. For example, the Code explains that the evaluation “could also be an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the standards system, either in respect of its internal structure (e.g. 
financial management) or of its ability to provide tangible benefits and incentives (e.g. fair prices) for 
its participants”, thus to some extent mirroring our definition of “private benefit” v. “social welfare”. 
55  http://www.msc.org/about-us/consultations/current-consultations/monitoring-and-evalua-ting-
the-impacts-of-the-msc-certification-programme/Consultation%20document%20 Monitoring%20-
%20evaluation%20consultation%20document.pdf  
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framework definition provided by ISEAL aims to represent a “universally applicable 
definition of sustainability” (see FAO-ISEAL, 2010). This development – termed within the 
ISEAL Alliance ‘scaling-up’ of their current efforts – corresponds to a long-term plan to 
involve public and private organizations and trigger a common definition of core 
sustainability values, starting from the Brundtland Commission’s report of 1987 “Our 
Common Future” and continuing with the incorporation of previous voluntary certification 
systems (FLO, MSC, UTZ Certified); tools generated by UN bodies (UN/ECOSOC, FAO, 
ILO, UNEP, etc.); corporations (e.g. WalMart Sustainability Index); NGOs (e.g. Transparency 
International, the Bellagio STAMP); and academia (e.g. the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress).  
Within this context, a definition of sustainability has emerged, which can be considered at 
the moment among the most sophisticated and widely acknowledged definition to be used 
for public policy purposes. More in detail, sustainability has been articulated along four key 
dimensions/preconditions: good governance; social development; environmental integrity 
and economic resilience. Good governance includes both ‘active participation’ indicators – 
i.e. reflecting the degree of active participation by interested parties in local management and 
decision-making – and ‘transparency’ indicators, including indicators on the three core 
dimensions of Assessment, Prevention of Corruption and Compliance).56  The ‘economic 
resilience’ indicators, on the other hand, incorporate dimensions of ‘secure livelihoods’ 
(including poverty alleviation and measured as on average per capita income of the farm, 
forestry, or fishery enterprise); resilience to economic risk (measured as degree of 
diversification of funding sources); inclusivity of the value chain and various social capital 
indicators. ‘Social development’ encompasses a wide array of sub-indicators, from right to 
food and use of resources to labour rights, non-discrimination and equity (including gender 
equality), access to education and knowledge, health and access to sanitation and respect for 
cultural identity. Finally, the ‘environmental integrity’ dimension looks at impacts on air, 
water, land and soil, biodiversity, climate change and eco-efficiency.  
Based on this definition of sustainability, and thanks to the original initiative of ISEAL, FAO 
has been able to start a very ambitious process of consolidation of existing labels and private 
standards into a common theoretical framework for the assessment of the sustainability of 
food and agricultural schemes. More in detail, FAO has explained that companies active in 
these sectors and wishing to ensure they achieve minimum levels of sustainability should 
follow a number of mandatory steps, as illustrated in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Steps in sustainability management 
 
Source: FAO (2012) 
                                                   
56 The latter indicators are tentatively based on the availability of social-economic and environmental 
information relating to the business, enterprise or policy intervention, including monitoring data, 
management plans, and financial accounts. See FAO-ISEAL (2010).  
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The joint FAO-ISEAL definition of sustainability indicators is certainly still an ongoing 
exercise, as testified by the many definitions that are still pending. However, it represents at 
once a promising avenue for public-private cooperation in global governance, and also the 
implicit recognition that private governance can significantly contribute to the design, 
implementation and enforcement of tools that aim at pursuing public policy objectives. The 
spider graph developed by FAO and ISEAL (Figure 4 below) shows the relative strengths of 
NGOs, government and businesses on the various indicators of sustainability described 
above. The figure shows, in particular, that key governance indicators such as participation, 
transparency and ongoing assessment are more likely to fall in the remit of governments, 
rather than NGOs and businesses.  
Figure 4. Relative commitment and strength for sustainability 
 
Source: FAO-ISEAL (2010). 
The making of SAFA: towards a theoretical evaluation model? 
Within this general framework, FAO has decided to elaborate on the joint work with ISEAL 
and involve stakeholders in the development of detailed guidelines for the two ‘assess’ 
phases in Table 1, i.e. the ex ante sustainability assessment, and the ex post monitoring, 
progress-tracking and evaluation. This set of guidelines, still in the making, is known under 
the acronym SAFA, i.e. Sustainability Assessment of Food and Agriculture systems. In order 
to develop SAFA, in 2010 FAO mapped all sustainability indicators for the food sector and 
compiled a list of performance indicators, based on the review of dozens of corporate 
responsibility, social and environmental standards and sustainability reports of food chain 
actors. This resulted in a revised list of draft sustainability goals and scope, and was the basis 
of a first e-forum with stakeholders, which eventually involved 246 people from 61 countries. 
Later, in mid-2011, FAO asked the Swiss College of Agriculture and the Research Institute 
for Organic Agriculture (FiBL) to undertake a SAFA stakeholder survey, which targeted field 
experts from the food and agriculture industry, public administrations, NGOs, multi-
stakeholder roundtables and multilateral institutions. This led, in the second half of 2011 to a 
cross-comparison of standards and indicator which addressed 44 systems (18 industry 
standards, 5 farm-level systems, 4 systems of multilateral institutions, 7 NGO systems, 5 
roundtable standards and 5 other systems).  
In the occasion of the second e-Forum in January 2012, which still revealed a degree of 
criticism on the content of the SAFA framework, FAO decided to circulate draft guidelines, 
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which are currently being revised by a group of experts. The structure of the current SAFA 
guidelines draws mostly upon ISO 14040:2006, the ISEAL Code of Good Practice and the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and the Food Sector Supplement of the GRI. The SAFA 
guidelines, though voluntary, appear very close to ‘real’ impact assessment guidelines, from 
a number of aspects. First, they are based on core principles. Just like the Mandelkern report 
in the EU set seven core principles for better regulation (necessity, proportionality, 
subsidiarity, transparency, accountability, accessibility and simplicity), the SAFA guidelines 
are based on six methodological principles: relevance, simplicity, cost efficiency, goal 
orientation, performance orientation and transparency.  
Second, the SAFA guidelines are comprehensive, i.e. they look at social, environmental, 
economic and governance aspects of sustainability in the targeted sector. More in detail, the 
guidelines lead to an assessment of economic resilience, social well-being, environmental 
integrity, and good governance indicators. The guidelines are disseminated with advice on 
existing methodologies that allow for quantification of impacts, just like the European 
Commission’s impact assessment guidelines. But in the SAFA guidelines, methods covered 
include frameworks developed within the private regulation contest (e.g. by IFOAM and the 
FSC); governance indicators focus especially on OECD good corporate governance 
principles, the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, and the UN Global Compact, and 
cover mostly accountability, fairness, evaluation (including transparency), participation and 
rule of law. 
Third, the SAFA guidelines are conceived to lead self-evaluators step-by-step. The first phase 
of goal definition is coupled with the definition of system boundaries and key indicators and 
thresholds, which will then be used in assessing the performance of the given system at 
hand. The following steps, i.e. data collection and analysis, interpretation and reporting, are 
described in less detail. But what is more important is that the SAFA guidelines attempt to 
define a set of indicators for each of the sub-categories covered (see Figure 5, left part), 
coupling them with minimum requirements and threshold values to assess performance. 
Values are set in a way that enable a traffic light assessment ranging from green (best 
performance) to red (insufficient performance). Finally, the result of the evaluation can be 
visualized as in Figure 5 below, in which the sample company performs very well in 
dimensions such as rule of law, participation, material cycles, product quality and capacity 
building, but performs insufficiently especially when it comes to preserving biodiversity.  
Figure 5. Dimensions covered by SAFA and example of result of an evaluation 
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As of now, the final text of the SAFA Guidelines is expected in early June 2012, and will be 
followed by two pilot applications by students of the University of Hohenheim (Germany), 
followed by other pilots after the Earth Summit in Rio. The results of the pilot testing will 
feed into another revision of the SAFA Guidelines in 2013. 
3.2 Towards a theoretical evaluation model 
The previous sections have described the rise of transnational private regulation as a 
dominant paradigm in several policy domains; the absence of a real framework for the 
evaluation of these governance schemes by public policymakers; and the ongoing ‘gap-
filling’ by meta-regulators that help private organizations set their own goals and converge 
towards public policy objectives. In all this, the informational asymmetries that remain 
between private players and public policymakers suggest that it would not be efficient, on 
the side of public policy, to abdicate the task of monitoring and evaluation and to delegate it 
entirely to private meta-regulators. Evidence from past experience (e.g., the FSC, 
GlobalGAP) suggests that the role of public policymakers should remain crucial in the 
context of global governance of key areas such as the ones mentioned in this paper (food, 
sustainability, fundamental rights, financial markets, IT, etc.). 
The evaluation of private governance schemes in public regulation can take place in different 
phases of the policy cycle. When self- or co-regulatory schemes are proposed in response to 
action by public policymakers, of course they will form part of the available regulatory 
options to be compared in an ex ante RIA. However, as already clarified, this is not always 
the case: many private governance schemes are created independently of public regulation, 
and this leads commentators to often exclude the possibility that a systematic monitoring of 
private governance by public regulators could ever take place. At the same time, there might 
be cases in which scrutiny by a regional or national policymaker is not very helpful, due to 
the global nature of private governance arrangements.  
Both these arguments, however, are not conclusive. Monitoring does not coincide with 
oversight. Incentives to monitor existing private schemes may serve the purpose of deciding 
if and what kind of public intervention is needed. More in detail, the evolution of the smart 
regulation agenda, especially in the EU, increasingly points at ‘closing the policy cycle’, and 
thus at engaging in constant monitoring of the effects of existing regulatory schemes – 
whether public or private – through the use of indicators and a sequential, logically 
consistent use of ex ante, interim and ex post evaluation.57 Moreover, the fact that private 
governance arrangements tend to be global certainly implies that the best possible response 
would in many cases be an appraisal by international bodies or through public regulatory 
cooperation; however, nothing prevents a national or regional policymaker from assessing 
whether certain international rules are sufficient or desirable with respect to its own public 
policy goals.  
That said, we conceived our overall evaluation framework along a number of sequential 
steps.  
Step 1 Origin and type of private governance. As explained in the previous sections, most 
private schemes are not generated by policy decisions; at the same time, there is a 
variety of schemes dealing with one, a sub-set, or all phases of the policy cycle 
(described using the ANIME framework as in Figure 2 above). This determines the 
depth and scope of the evaluation to be performed. At the same time, the 
description of the type of initiative could take into account the reasons for the 
                                                   
57 See the European Commission Communication on Smart Regulation in the EU, COM(2010)543, 8 
October 2010. 
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creation of the private governance scheme (signalling, controlling the value chain, 
complementing public regulation, replacing/pre-empting public regulation, inter-
firm coordination and co-opetition, collusion/mutual benefit, etc.), which in turn 
orients the direction of the assessment.  
Step 2 Governance preconditions. The analysis of existing experiences in the literature 
suggests that a number of governance features can positively affect the performance 
of private governance schemes. This phase implies the assessment of the 
preconditions for the effectiveness of a private governance scheme from a public 
policy standpoint. As such, it includes the use of indicators such as participation, 
materiality, completeness, diversity of funding, specific governance arrangements, 
internal use of indicators and existence of self-evaluation or external evaluation 
arrangements.58  
Step 3 Quality, legitimacy, enforcement. This step of the framework entails the analysis of 
how the arrangements identified in step 2 possibly affect these three key dimensions 
of private governance.59  
Step 4 Effectiveness. Three different types of indicators seem relevant for an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of private governance: i) activity and governance indicators. 
Indicators that correlate governance features and regulatory activities of the private 
governance scheme; ii) compliance indicators, i.e. indicators used as means of 
reporting and signalling compliance with statutory goals helping verifying 
consistency between means and goals; and iii) Impact indicators, which include 
criteria and indicators used to evaluate the performance of private regulatory 
schemes and their impact on different constituencies – e.g. whether the expected 
distributional consequences have occurred or wealth transfers are needed to correct 
unexpected effects. These latter ‘meta-indicators’, in particular, are useful for public 
policymakers to understand whether private regulators evaluate themselves on the 
basis of ‘private’ effectiveness.  
Step 5 Incorporation in public policy appraisal. The evaluation of the effectiveness of private 
governance arrangements becomes an important input to the forms of public 
evaluation of policy options that are available, for example at the EU level. 
Depending on the results of previous steps, the most appropriate tools that will host 
the evaluation will be an ex-ante analysis, an interim or ex post evaluation. In 
addition, it is important that a number of additional filters are applied to private 
governance. These include a number of screens, normally available (although not 
yet fully developed) in the European Commission’s impact assessment practice: 
o Competition assessment: the interaction of competitors within private governance 
schemes can lead to forms of collusion and anticompetitive outcomes; at the 
same time, vertical agreements that are aimed at securing private benefit might 
not always converge towards a virtuous outcome – take the example of 
GlobalGAP, or private agreements between ISPs and content providers for 
copyright enforcement in cyberspace. Competition assessment tools have been 
developed by the OECD over the past few years, and are still insufficiently used 
in ex ante policy appraisal60. They could be put to use with the aim to assess 
whether the private governance scheme at hand are likely to hamper the 
                                                   
58 An example of a paper that uses indicators to assess the existence of such preconditions is Fuchs & 
Kalfagianni (2010). 
59 See above, beginning of section 2 for a definition of these three dimensions. 
60 See the OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit, 2007 (revised in 2010).  
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competitive process by raising non-participants’ costs, worsen barriers to entry 
of expansion, raise prices above competitive levels, etc. These tools can be 
designed in a way that mirrors current knowledge in competition law 
enforcement, such as for example the assessment of the existence of basic 
preconditions for stable collusion (transparency, symmetry, 
enforcement/retaliation, homogeneity of products, etc.).  
o SIA. The sustainability impact assessment methodology has been developed and 
applied at the EU level mostly along with the negotiation of free trade 
agreements (see i.a. George & Kirkpatrick, 2007). This toolkit is conceived to 
assess a variety of sustainability-related consequences starting from negotiations 
pure related to trade. As such, it has developed in a way that accounts for 
private governance schemes, as well as constant consultation and involvement 
of public and private partners. The European Commission has used the tools in 
a number of occasions, including in the development of its new strategy on 
tourism and horticulture, as well as in international trade negotiations with 
several partners.61 
o Crime-proofing. A methodology for testing proposed legislation against the 
likelihood of criminal behaviour has been developed by the TRANSCRIME 
project.62 For example, one of the applications led the authors to find that the 
eAccessibility communication of the European Commission left the regulation of 
online payment systems to self-regulation, without fully assessing the impact 
that this policy option would exert on security and crime.  
o Fundamental rights test. A specific methodology to assess impacts of proposed 
policy options on fundamental rights is available since May 2011 on the 
Commission’s website. This methodology includes a fundamental rights check-
list, which – although not very detailed – could guide the assessment of various 
policy options with respect to certain, ‘non-negotiable’ issues.63  
o Specific risk assessment. This test could be designed as focusing on ‘what can go 
wrong’ with private governance. As we described in section 2 above, depending 
on the circumstances lock-in effects and collective action problems, path 
dependency, status quo bias, anchoring and framing effects, hard-to-detect 
changes, divergence of interests and self-indulgence in the evaluation can 
emerge, thus undermining the effectiveness of a private governance scheme. 
o Sectoral competitiveness proofing. This test was recently added by the European 
Commission to the toolkit to be used within an ex ante impact assessment of a 
new policy initiative. 64  However, the European Commission clarified in its 
recent working paper: “In the case of policy interventions of a self-regulatory 
nature (such as codes of conduct, or voluntary standards), the case for an in-
depth analysis of impacts on sectoral competitiveness is likely to be limited since 
                                                   
61  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf. See PWC study on 
horticulture. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_130129.pdf  
62 See http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Final_Report-
A_study_on_Crime_Proofing.pdf  
63 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/docs/sec_2011_0567_en.pdf  
64 See European Commission Staff Working Document, Operational Guidance For Assessing Impacts 
On Sectoral Competitiveness Within The Commission Impact Assessment System, A 
“Competitiveness Proofing” Toolkit for use in Impact Assessments, SEC(2012)91 final, 27 January 
2012.  
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the sector itself plays a key role in determining the content of the initiative. 
However, more detailed scrutiny may be required with regard to impacts on 
competition within the sector and on the competitiveness of upstream or 
downstream sectors.” Given our approach to private regulation, this ‘non-
interference’ approach appears unfortunate: to the contrary, the competitiveness 
impact of a given private regulation scheme must be carefully appraised.  
o Overall policy coherence test. Most important of all, from the standpoint of public 
policy it is essential to assess whether private governance schemes have set 
operational and specific objectives, which are consistent with the long-term goal 
set by public policymakers. For example, the EU has set important long-term 
goals related to competitiveness, innovation, poverty and sustainability within 
its Europe2020 strategy and the seven flagship initiatives that compose it. Even 
if fully effective, private governance schemes might not be fully aligned with the 
public goals set within given jurisdictions, which set targets that might require 
additional policy intervention. The use of policy appraisal tools, be they ex ante 
or ex post, is essential to test this form of alignment between private gain, social 
benefits and policy targets.  
This theoretical framework can easily accommodate the use of at least three different types of 
indicators, which have been advocated in the literature. First, governance indicators can be 
used at step 3 of our proposed analytical framework to enable an analysis of whether the 
basic preconditions for effective private regulation exist. Performance indicators can be used 
at step 4 of the analysis to assess effectiveness directly. Finally, distributional impact 
indicators are essential in step 5 of the analysis, when the overall impact of the private 
governance scheme is assessed (Cafaggi & Pistor, 2012). 
4. Conclusion 
Private regulation is emerging as a viable solution for a number of problems faced by 
contemporary societies, and can be superior to traditional command and control regulation 
due to informational asymmetries, superior coordination, the need for trans-national 
cooperation and standardization, and also the superior flexibility and adaptability of de-
ossified, privately implemented, designed and enforced rules. This development is, however, 
still largely ignored by guidance documents on ex ante policy appraisal for public 
policymakers; meanwhile, private regulators themselves are developing their own guidance 
documents, even in the form of meta-private regulation offered by emerging conglomerates 
such as the ISEAL Alliance. In this paper, we try to propose a theoretical framework that 
could guide public policymakers in assessing whether, and in what form, private regulation 
can prove the most appropriate form of policy intervention. A key role in this respect is to be 
attributed to the assessment of the effectiveness of private regulation as an alternative or 
more likely as a complement to public regulation. We propose a six-step theoretical 
framework and argue that IA techniques should:  
a) Define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used 
as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation. This, in turn, calls for a taxonomy of 
the many ways in which public and private regulation can coexist along a continuum, 
from extreme cases in which private regulators take care of most of the policy process 
(from agenda-setting to the setting of basic principles, implementation criteria, 
enforcement practices and compliance monitoring); to more hybrid (and also more 
recurrent) cases in which public policymakers set the ultimate objectives and principles, 
and private governance complements them by setting modes of implementation and 
compliance (as in the case of standardization policy at the EU level). 
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b) Involve private parties in public IAs. When the use of private regulation is contemplated by 
public policymakers, private regulators should be asked to contribute to the IA exercise 
in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the 
regulatory objectives. This of course can happen only when public regulators 
intentionally leave at least part of the policy space to action by private regulators, and not 
in all those cases in which private governance emerges in the absence of the law.  
c) Contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators 
and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators. Although indicators are 
widespread in private governance, we contend that there might be significant differences 
between the effectiveness perceived by a private governance scheme (in the form of 
‘private payoff’ of the members) and the ability of the same scheme to achieve publicly 
set regulatory objectives (the ‘social benefits’ of private regulation). Using indicators 
oriented towards the private benefit to measure progress towards the achievement of 
public goals would inevitably prove misleading: Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ does not 
always work that smoothly. Accordingly, various types of indicators (governance, 
impacts, distributional effects) must be used to assess compliance with overall regulatory 
objectives. 
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